Preventing violent extremism

cfps Centre for Public Scrutiny

accountability, transparency, involvement

This policy briefing examines strategies aimed at the prevention of violent extremism (PVE) in local areas, detailed in the national counter-terrorism strategy *Contest* under the banner of its *Prevent* strategy. *Prevent* aims to thwart extremist behaviour within local communities at home and abroad. By insulating vulnerable persons in local communities from extremist behaviour, it is hoped that terrorist attacks perpetrated by British nationals, within and outside of the United Kingdom, will be curtailed.

Countering violent extremism in the community, an initiative which has developed since the London bombings in 2005, is a comparatively new role for local government. Whilst the government has conducted oversight reviews of its *Prevent* strategy[1], these reviews have been at national level. There is a clear need – where *Prevent* work is especially active – for local overview and scrutiny to be aware of how authorities and their partners fulfil their responsibility to plan, direct, implement and evaluate schemes aimed at preventing violent extremism. The Government is considering changes to the *Contest* programme, but even if *Contest* is replaced it is highly likely that local community work will remain central to any new scheme.

This briefing sets out how PVE schemes are organised at the local level, providing possible ways for scrutineers to hold to account those working to prevent violent extremism – in terms of linking to national priorities, ensuring value for money and preventing inappropriate uses of anti-terrorism legislation by local authorities and their partners. It seeks to answer why it would be beneficial for local decision-makers to conduct scrutiny reviews into these schemes.

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[1] See 'The Role of Scrutiny in Preventing Violent Extremism' later on in this briefing for full details of HM government's accountability of *Prevent*

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1.   National policies

What is *Contest*?[2]

1.1   *Contest* is the United Kingdom's national counter-terrorism strategy, first made publicly available in 2006, but modified and updated by the current coalition government. It is divided into four areas: **Prevent**, **Pursue**, **Protect**, and **Prepare**.

1.2   It aims at countering violent radicalisation, challenging extremism, and preventing terrorism against British interests and the British public, within and outside of the United Kingdom. It does this by identifying and isolating those who are involved in extremist activity (*Pursue*), insulating those vulnerable from violent extremism and tackling radicalisation (*Prevent*), building measures to protect the wider public from terrorist attacks (*Protect*), and cultivating public resilience to the negative impact of terrorism (*Prepare*).

1.3   *Contest* was updated by the current government 'following a review in 2010 to take account of changes in the nature of the terrorist threat to the country since 2009, such as the death of Usama bin Laden, and because it believed the *Prevent* strand of the previous strategy was flawed'[3]. The segment of *Contest* that involves the most work at local level is *Prevent*.

What is *Prevent*?[4]

1.4   *Prevent* is aimed at targeting those those vulnerable to extremist rhetoric or behaviour in England[5], such as children, young people, and

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[2] The full *Contest* strategy document can be found at
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest
[3] Local Government Association, 'Counter-Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Briefing from the LGA for prospective police and crime commissioners', p.2, http://www.local.gov.uk/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=6867c8d9-70d3-410c-af3e-3e5cc5a0ca10&groupId=10171, Accessed 5th April 2013
[4] The full *Prevent* strategy document can be found at
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-strategy-2011
[5] The *Prevent* strategy is devolved in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The main exception is the role of the police in *Prevent* in Wales, which is not devolved

vulnerable adults. It seeks to insulate these groups from extremist rhetoric and behaviour.

1.5   In the words of the Government, *Prevent*[6]*:*

- Responds to the ideological challenge we face from terrorism and aspects of extremism, and the threat we face from those who promote these views;
- Provides practical help to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure they are given appropriate advice and support;
- Works with a wide range of sectors (including education, criminal justice, faith, charities, online and health) where there are risks of radicalisation that we need to deal with.

1.6   *Prevent* has a national and international dimension, reflecting the fact that many of those involved in extremism in the UK are radicalised abroad.

Scrutiny at the national level

1.7   The current Government has conducted independent oversight and scrutiny reviews of its *Prevent* strategy, notably the Carlile report[7] and a public consultation which was summarised in a Government report produced in June 2011[8]. Aside from these, the government conducts annual reports to check the progress of *Contest*, and within Parliament the Home Affairs Committee, the Communities and Local Government Select Committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee have all taken a close interest in aspects of *Prevent* in the past[9] .

1.8   The current *Prevent* strategy is itself a review of the previous *Prevent* strategy that was implemented in 2005/6, in light of what the current government saw as flaws around implementation and accountability. Government has also made sure to recently re-evaluate what it considers are the primary roots of violent radicalisation in the United Kingdom[10] in order to make sure that the current *Prevent* strategy is correct and proportionate to the threats against the safety of the British public.

1.9   National work and scrutiny is predicated on the existence of effective scrutiny at local level. *Prevent* explicitly states that 'locally, *Prevent* work is accountable to elected councillors and will need to be

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[6] https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/protecting-the-uk-against-terrorism/supporting-pages/prevent, Accessed 3rd April 2013
[7] Alex Carlile, Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., *Report to the Home Secretary of Independent Oversight of Prevent Review and Strategy*, May 2011
[8] HM Government, *Prevent Review: Summary of responses to the consultation*, June 2011
[9] HM Government, *Prevent Strategy*, June 2011, p.96
[10] House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, *Roots of Violent Radicalisation, Nineteenth Report of Session 2010-2012*, published 6th February 2012

discussed and considered by the police with new Police and Crime Commissioners'[11]. *Prevent* also explicitly sponsors scrutiny of the strategy at the local level: 'we believe that *Prevent* would benefit from greater scrutiny and increased levels of independent oversight. For that reason, we intend also to establish a non-executive *Prevent* board to oversee the *Prevent* strategy and its local implementation'[12].

1.10   It goes on to describe how there will be a non-executive *Prevent* board to oversee the *Prevent* strategy, and local implementation of this strategy, and that this board 'will be permanent, with strong, independent membership, but not statutory'[13]. Furthermore, it stipulates that local authorities should have partnerships in place with other public service providers, and that these partnerships should instigate and maintain 'appropriate accountability, monitoring and evaluation, oversight and commissioning arrangements'[14].

Recent developments

1.11   In the wake of the attack in Woolwich in May 2013, the Prime Minister has announced the establishment of a Tackling Extremism and Radicalisation Task Force (TERFOR), which will comprise senior ministers at national level. At the time of writing it is unclear whether this precedes a minor, or major, review of *Contest* and *Prevent*.

2.   At local level

How are local government and public service providers involved?

2.1   In line with the *Prevent* strategy, local authorities have a responsibility to plan, implement, and review schemes at countering radicalisation and preventing violent extremism[15]. This filters through to other areas of local authority work such as social care and social services, housing, education and community safety, amongst others. All documentation pertinent to *Prevent* reiterates how important local authorities are to tackling violent extremism and radicalisation in communities across the UK[16]. This was established when the report first became public in 2011, and has since been reviewed and re-emphasised in the 2012 Annual Report into the implementation of *Contest*[17].

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[11] HM Government, *Prevent Strategy*, June 2011, p.96

[12] Ibid., p.96

[13] Ibid., p.96

[14] Ibid., p.97

[15] HM Government, *Contest: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism*, July 2011, p.63

[16] Local Government Association, 'Counter-Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Briefing from the LGA for prospective police and crime commissioners', p.5, http://www.local.gov.uk/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=6867c8d9-70d3-410c-af3e-3e5cc5a0ca10&groupId=10171, Accessed 5th April 2013

[17] HM Government, *CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism Annual Report* 2012, March 2013, p.21

2.2 One of the guiding documents for local authority coordination of *Prevent* is the *Channel* framework. *Channel* is designed to use existing collaboration between local authorities, statutory partners (such as the education and health sectors, social services, children's and youth services and offender management services), the police and the local community to[18]:

- Identify individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism;
- Assess the nature and extent of that risk;
- Develop the most appropriate support plan for the individuals concerned.

2.3 *Channel* is best viewed as a guide from central government as to how local authorities should coordinate the myriad of stakeholders involved in prevention of violent extremism schemes. Whilst it does give leeway for local authorities to organise and implement their own schemes, *Channel* stipulates that local authorities must organise and coordinate a multi-agency panel with appropriate information sharing protocols between the relevant public services. The panel's principal role is in safeguarding and managing risk[19].

2.4 Depending on the nature of the issues (and individual cases) under discussion, the panel may include representatives from a wide range of local organisations, including those who currently sit on Community Safety Partnerships. It is modelled on similar partnerships for community safety and child protection[20]. *Channel* now covers about 75 local authorities and 12 police force areas[21].

2.5 *Channel* appears to be designed for those areas identified as priorities for the government, but no formal guidance has been provided as to when authorities should, and should not, establish *Channel* arrangements[22]. In particular there is no stipulation as to how panel arrangements might function in two-tier areas.

2.6 Local authorities are further involved in *Prevent* work by the running of Local Resilience Forums (LRFs), bodies which are focused on emergencies and major incidents but which still have an important influence in preventing violent extremism[23].

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[18] HM Government, *Channel: Protecting Vulnerable People from Being Drawn into Terrorism; A guide for Local Partnerships*, October 2012, p.4
[19] HM Government, *Channel: Protecting Vulnerable People from Being Drawn into Terrorism; A guide for Local Partnerships*, October 2012, p.7
[20] Ibid., p.8
[21] HM Government, *Prevent Strategy*, June 2011, p.57
[22] Ibid., pp.97-98
[23] London Local Resilience Forum, Minutes of the Meeting on the 17th January 2012; http://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/LLRF-minutes-meeting-38.pdf, Accessed 5th April 2013

2.7   The wide cross-cutting approach that *Prevent* requires cannot be overstated. The complex partnership work requires demands that a similarly cross-cutting approach be taken towards accountability.

How are Preventing Violent Extremism Schemes organised?

2.8   The first step in the organisation of *Prevent* in local areas is initially through the production of Counter Terrorism Local Profile reports. These are strategic reports produced by local authorities in conjunction with local police forces with the aims to[24]:

- Develop a joint understanding amongst local partners of the threats, vulnerabilities and risks relating to terrorism and non-violent extremism where it creates an environment conducive to terrorism;
- Provide information on which to base local *Prevent* programmes and action plans;
- Support the mainstreaming of *Prevent* activity into day-to-day policing, local government and partnership work;
- Allow a targeted and proportionate use of shared resources.

2.9   These reports essentially outline the threat from violent extremism in a local area, and put in place structures for information sharing and coordination between stakeholders in local *Prevent* initiatives. This is not a demographic, desktop exercise – it is based on local knowledge and intelligence[25].

The Impact of prevention schemes on community harmony

2.10   The Government's view is that a more integrated society is one less prone to extremism, as set out in the DCLG document *Creating the Conditions for Integration*[26]. However, the Government has been keen not to link too closely the aims of preventing violent extremism with the wider aim of enhancing integration (a link that has been described as "securitising" integration", and which has been perceived as counterproductive)[27].

2.11   The national counter-terrorism strategy is predominantly focused on the threat from Islamist extremism; currently, this is highlighted as the greatest threat to the United Kingdom[28]. However, due to this, there

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[24] HM Government, *Counter-Terrorism Local Profiles: An Updated Guide*, September 2012, p.7

[25] Wandsworth Borough Council Environment*, Culture and Community Safety Overview and Scrutiny Committee, 9th November 2011, Report by the Chief Executive and Director of Administration on the Prevent Strategy and Delivery Plan for 2011/13 in Wandsworth*, p.5

[26] Communities and Local Government, *Creating the Conditions for Integration*, 2012, p.6

[27] Local Government Association, 'Counter-Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Briefing from the LGA for prospective police and crime commissioners', p.2, http://www.local.gov.uk/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=6867c8d9-70d3-410c-af3e-3e5cc5a0ca10&groupId=10171, Accessed 5th April 2013

[28] Whilst the strategy also makes explicit reference to the threat from dissident republican terrorism in Northern Ireland, HM government judges this to be a lesser threat, and also the

have been strong criticism and concerns on the isolation of certain communities affect by counter-radicalisation schemes, prompting accusations of a focus by government on one particular group[29].

2.12   Birmingham City Council, as part of the national counter-terrorism initiative, conducted a scrutiny review of the Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) and CCTV services managed by West Midlands Police and funded by the Home Office via the Association of Chief Police Officers' Terrorism and Allied Matters Committee (ACPO TAM). The Project consists of 216 surveillance cameras mainly within two wards: Washwood Heath and Sparkbrook. They reported that with public acknowledgement of the scheme came protests from the city's Muslim communities who felt they were being targeted due to biased prejudice in the aftermath of 9/11 and 7/7[30]. West Yorkshire Authorities reported similar sentiments on the *Prevent* strategy implemented by the previous Labour administration.

2.13   Furthermore, Manchester City Council and Wandsworth Borough Council noted the problems of inter-community hostility: Manchester Council reported on marches by the English Defence League in protest of perceived and actual transgressions by the national and local Muslim communities[31], whilst Wandsworth Borough Council reported that 'the new Prevent strategy has received a lot of negative press both in the Muslim and non-Muslim communities'[32]. Luton Borough Council, responding to pressure from inter-community hostility between the English Defence League and the local Asian population, has implemented a strategy designed to increase community cohesion[33].

2.14   This demonstrates that, for the wider benefit for the relationship between local authorities, public service providers, and the public as a whole, there is a clear role for scrutiny in ensuring that efforts to tackle violent extremism do not themselves promote division, and that they are proportionate and transparent in the way they work. This in turn can help to build and develop trust within the local community.

Value for Money and Preventing Violent Extremism

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shared responsibility with the Northern Ireland Office. *Contest* is meant for use for counter-terrorism of all forms, but uses Islamist Terrorism as its focus group for basing its deductions for effective counter-terrorism

[29] Paul Thomas (2010), 'Failed and Friendless: The UK's 'Preventing Violent Extremism' Programme', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, *Vol.12*, pp.442-458, pp.442-443

[30] Birmingham City Council, *Project Champion: Scrutiny Review into ANPR and CCTV Cameras*, November 2010, p.8

[31] Manchester City Council, *Report for Resolution to the Communities Scrutiny Committee on Preventing Violent Extremism*, 6th February 2013, p.17

[32] Wandsworth Borough Council, p.5

[33] Luton Borough Council, *'Building Cohesion in Luton'; Report on the Luton Commission on Community Cohesion*, January 2011

2.15   The *Contest* strategy explicitly states that 'counter-terrorism in general must provide value for money. *Prevent* in particular must not waste public funds on projects irrelevant to its objectives'[34]. There is a specific commitment around value for money[35].

2.16   It is therefore crucial that, at local level, there is a system to evaluate and confirm that work is targeted and valuable, and that public funds are used proportionately and in a transparent fashion, backed by strong levels of accountability.

2.17   Adding to the complexity of this exercise, there are many implicit costs related to preventing to violent extremism in communities and local areas which are not specifically designated for *Prevent* purposes. The pupil premium, for example, has been seen as a means to tackle these issues by increasing social mobility. Individual councils will have their own strategies, and budgetary commitments, for enhancing community cohesion and integration which will cut across *Prevent* priorities.

2.18   It has been reported that over 80 projects designed by local authorities relating to *Prevent* were approved in 2012 as local authorities were increasingly merging projects relating to *Prevent* into other aspects of their work (for example child protection)[36]. Therefore, it may become harder to delineate between schemes aimed at explicitly preventing violent extremism and schemes aimed at addressing social problems and community cohesion.

3.   Implications for scrutiny

3.1   As we have seen there are opportunities for scrutiny arising, in particular, from the *Prevent* programme.

3.2   Despite central government's explicit sponsorship of scrutiny of *Prevent* at the operational level, there have been little in-depth scrutiny reviews at the local level of this strategy – arguably where it matters most.

3.3   Where work has happened, it has (unsurprisingly) been focused on the *Prevent* priority areas. Birmingham, Luton and Manchester councils have all carried out reviews into their PVE schemes, and Tower Hamlets published an evaluation of projects related to *Prevent* in its borough in March 2011[37].

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[34] HM Government, *Contest: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism*, July 2011, p.60
[35] HM Government, *Prevent Strategy*, June 2011, p.1
[36] HM Government, *CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism Annual Report* 2012, March 2013, p.21
[37] Giorgia Iacopini, Laura Stock and Dr. Kerstin Junge, *Evaluation of Tower Hamlets Prevent Projects*, The Tavistock Institute, March 2011

3.4   The need for authorities to consider scrutiny of PVE/*Prevent* is particular pressing, given that there have been accusations and controversies concerning abuses of powers granted to local authorities by national counter-terrorism legislation[38]. Scrutiny is not an audit function, but effective oversight will help to tackle some of these issues (principally, the inappropriate use of anti-terrorism powers, or poor value for money arising out of *Prevent* projects).

Opportunities and challenges for scrutiny

3.5   Now that the Government is planning a wholesale review of *Contest* and *Prevent*, it may be worthwhile for authorities which have been active in tackling extremism to consider evaluating the success of those schemes and their wider effects on the local community. There are a number of other compelling reasons why – for relevant authorities – scrutiny might be productive:

- Developing relationships with academics and building upon extensive academic study of these issues[39],[40]
- Scrutiny is uniquely placed to tackle the challenges posed by the partnership focus of *Prevent*. The involvement of a range of partners is a challenge to accountability, and also to delivery, as responsibility for delivering outcomes may be unclear and duplication may occur. Scrutiny can take an overarching view where this is perceived to be a problem in a way that no other local body or institution can (although see below for some challenges around partnership working);
- Scrutiny is in a particular position to engage with the local community over the impacts – positive and negative – of *Prevent* work, due to it being led by elected councillors.

3.6   There are also challenges:

- Preventing violent extremism schemes have to operate under a certain level of privacy in order for those conducting the

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[38] For example, Matt Gaw, 'Suffolk: Council Approved Investigation Using Counter-Terror Powers', East Anglia Daily Times, 19th November 2012, http://www.eadt.co.uk/news/politics/suffolk_council_approved_investigation_using_counter_terror_powers_1_1697501, Accessed 8th April 2013; 'Local Councils Abusing Anti Terrorism Powers for Lesser Crimes', Huffington Post, 22nd August 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2012/08/21/local-councils-abusing-anti-terrorism-powers_n_1819715.html, Accessed 8th April 2012

[39] As a selection: Rachel Briggs (2010), 'Community Engagement for Counterterrorism: Lessons from the United Kingdom', *International Affairs*, *Vol. 86*, *No.4*, pp.971-981; Therese O'Toole, Stephen H. Jones, and Daniel Nilsson DeHanas, 'The New Prevent: Will It Work? Can It Work?', *Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance Working Paper*, *No.2*, *Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship*, *University of Bristol, December 2011*; Rachel Briggs, Catherine Fieschi, Hannah Lownsbrough, 'Bringing it Home: Community Based Approaches to Counterterrorism', *DEMOS*, 2006

[40] For example the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at King's College London, and The Centre for the Study of 'Radicalisation' and Political Violence at Aberystwyth University

programmes, and those that are benefiting from the programmes, to be adequately protected;

- These schemes are not quick fixes but a long term treatment of a significant threat to national security, through actions taken at local level. Therefore, measuring the benefits of such schemes may take some time to explicitly materialise, and the benefits may not be directly reflected in individual authorities' areas;
- Tracing funding is not easy due to the myriad of projects under the *Prevent* banner.
- Counter-terrorism at the community level is a new development for local government. As such there may be a lack of institutional experience and understanding on the topic;
- Trying to establish the benefits of schemes devised by local authorities to prevent violent extremism will have to take place over the long term which means that scrutiny reviews may need to draw on evidence from a number of years in order to draw conclusions. Such evidence may not yet be available in some areas;
- There are a myriad of stakeholders involved in schemes aimed at preventing violent extremism. A wider range of partners means it can be confusing as to know where best to start outside scrutiny reviews and a hierarchy of stakeholders may be more difficult to ascertain; therefore it may be harder for scrutineers to know who best to target reviews towards in regards to recommendations;
- Selecting a particular topic may be challenging. The PVE agenda is extremely broad and links in to an even wider range of topics. Poorly planned work could be overwhelming but the *Prevent* agenda may prove difficult to compartmentalise. For many, the approach to take may be to look at *Prevent* activities and outcomes as part of reviews of other topics, where there is a knock-on impact;
- Terrorism, countering violent extremism and radicalisation etc. are very complex topics. The academic debate on these is at times polarised, with many divergent, educated opinions on these topics contradicting one another. Coupled with a lack of institutional knowledge and experience on these topics, this makes it very hard for the lay scrutineer to tackle head on.

Possible approaches

3.7 The experience of others who have carried out reviews in this area (see section below) suggests that the first step that authorities considering work in this area will need to take is to assess whether scrutiny by councillors is proportionate. A substantial minority of authorities undertake *Prevent* work; whether or not scrutiny of this work is appropriate will depend on the extent to which that work is considered a priority by the authority and its partners, the extent to which violent extremism and community cohesion is seen as a significant local issue, and the amount of funds devoted to cohesion and prevention strategies.

3.8   Where, on the basis of such an assessment, scrutiny is seen as worthwhile, any scrutiny could look at:

- Whether decisions to spend the money being spent in carrying out these schemes are accountable. Strong, objective scrutiny could help partners fulfil their obligations whilst making their service provision and decision making more cost efficient to the public. Scrutiny here is crucial considering the amount of money that is being designated for counter-radicalisation purposes in communities across the United Kingdom;
- Whether schemes implicitly or explicitly, target certain individuals or communities. Scrutiny should place priority on making sure these schemes are fair, proportional, and free from inherent or cultural bias. Furthermore, strategies at the community level need to be immediate in evolving if and when the nature of the threat changes;
- Whether all relevant representatives of the public are included in the dialogue surrounding operations in the community aimed at preventing violent extremism and countering radicalisation;
- Whether attempts have been made to tackle abuses (or potential abuses) by local authorities and public service providers have been committed using powers granted to them by counter-terrorism legislation. Of course, there is no question of scrutiny being put in a position where it examines individual complaints;

3.9   Fundamentally, successful scrutiny of this topic will tackle and address issues of scale in *Prevent* (and its successor). Schemes aimed at counter-radicalisation and preventing violent extremism encompass a wide range of public services, each of which have a substantial influence on the success and failure of *Prevent* in local communities, for example prisons[41], schools, universities, and religious groups.

3.10   This means that, as well as different public service providers, different governmental departments also have a stake in the success of *Prevent*. For example the Department of Education has set up a 'Preventing Violent Extremism Unit to conduct financial and non-financial due diligence in order to minimise the risk that unsuitable providers could set up Free schools'[42]. With the scale of the number of participants involved in *Prevent*, it stands to reason that the scale of importance for effective scrutiny to establish the transparency and accountability of all stakeholders involved in preventing violent extremism is raised significantly.

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[41] A thorough analysis of the importance of prisons in effective counter-radicalisation and disengagement with extremism is Peter Neumann's, 'Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries', *The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence*, 2010

[42] Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., *Report to the Home Secretary of Independent Oversight of Prevent Review and Strategy*, May 2011, p.10

Appendix 1: Local Authorities that have conducted Scrutiny Reviews into Prevention of Violent Extremism Schemes, or Projects related to *Prevent* objectives

Association of West Yorkshire Authorities: Charles Husband and Yunis Alam, Cohesion, 'Counter Terrorism and Community in West Yorkshire', Joseph Rowntree Foundation, March 2011

Birmingham City Council: *Project Champion: Scrutiny Review into ANPR and CCTV Cameras*, November 2010

Hyndburn Borough Council: Update on PVE Programme, Report to the Overview and Scrutiny Committee, 1st September 2010, http://www.hyndburnbc.gov.uk/downloads/5._Preventing_Violent_Extremism_Update.pdf

Luton Borough Council: *'Building Cohesion in Luton'; Report on the Luton Commission on Community Cohesion*, January 2011, http://www.luton.gov.uk/Council_government_and_democracy/Lists/LutonDocuments/PDF/Community%20cohesion/Building%20Cohesion%20in%20Luton.pdf

Manchester City Council:
- *Report for Resolution to the Communities Scrutiny Committee on Preventing Violent Extremism*, 6th February 2013, http://www.manchester.gov.uk/egov_downloads/6._Preventing_violent_extremism.pdf
- *Manchester's Draft Prevent Delivery Plan, 2011/12 - 2012/13, Report to the Citizenship and Inclusion Overview and Scrutiny Committee*, 19th October 2011, http://www.manchester.gov.uk/egov_downloads/8_Prevent_2.pdf

- **Tower Hamlets Council:** Giorgia Iacopini, Laura Stock and Dr. Kerstin Junge, *Evaluation of Tower Hamlets Prevent Projects*, The Tavistock Institute, March 2011, http://www.tavinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Tavistock_Projects_Tower-Hamlets-PVE_evaluation_final_report.pdf

Appendix 2: glossary

Within the study of terrorism and political violence, there is much conflict over appropriate terms. Considering the context of this report[43], and as a means of ensuring consistency, the following terms are drawn from the *Prevent* strategy document and the Terrorism Act 2000. The definitions are specific to counter-terrorism in the United Kingdom.[44].

Extremism: is vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas[45].

Radicalisation: the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism[46].

Counter-radicalisation: refers to activity aimed at a group of people intended to dissuade them from engaging in terrorism-related activity[47].

Terrorism[48]: the use or threat of action where the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause. Action falls within this subsection if it:

(a) Involves serious violence against a person;
(b) Involves serious damage to property;
(c) Endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action;
(d) Creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public;
(e) Is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.

The current *Prevent* document specifically does not use the term "violent extremism" because the term is "ambiguous"[49]. However, the *Prevent* documents do state that the government will provide a **'challenge to extremist ideologies which can be made to justify terrorism'**[50]. As "PVE" and the term "violent extremism" have been used until recently, this document continues to refer to schemes aimed at countering radicalisation and extremism in local communities in the United Kingdom as such. This is so as to give the reader an easily understood phrase from which to read further, and particularly to engage with past government literature on the subject which uses the term.

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[43] The context is referring to the briefing being focused on governmental counter-terrorism strategy
[44] See also P. Neumann, 'Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries', *The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence*, 2010, p.12
[45] HM Government, *Prevent Strategy*, June 2011, p.107
[46] Ibid., p.108
[47] Ibid., p.107
[48] The following summarised definition is from the Terrorism Act 2000, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/part/I, Accessed 3rd April 2013
[49] HM Government, *Prevent Strategy*, June 2011, p.25
[50] Ibid., p.25